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Case No.
?6g5

I
I
1

J. B. and R. E. WALKER, INC., a corporation, I
Defendant and Appellant I

Brief of Plaintiffs and Respondents Rudds
With the permission of the Court the respondents'
brief will be divided into two parts to meet the two main
divisions of appellant's brief. This brief will consider
the right-of-way portions of the appeal. Substantially the
only difference as to the facts is that which would seem
to be more logically considered in connection with the
matter of waiver and is set forth, beginning of page 16.
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Most of appellant's brief is devoted to a claim of error
because the court:
1. Eefused to strike all evidence relating to a rightof-way.
2. Overruled appellant's objections to the admission
of evidence concerning the same.
3. Made a finding that a right-of-way by necessity
existed and
4. Eequired the defendant to provide access to
Rudd's property.
The basis of the objections is that the litigating of a
right of way was not within the pleadings and the introduction of the evidence concerning it was objected to
throughout the trial. For instance at the top of page 37
of the appellant's brief is found the statement:
"During the entire course of the trial the defendant objected to the admission of evidence of
this nature."
Neither of these contentions are correct
Before answering the brief of the Defendant and
Appellant it might be well to first consider the purpose
of the complaint.
THIS IS A PROCEEDING TO ENJOIN EXISTING
NUISANCE AND FOR DAMAGES CAUSED THEREBY
In general, the nuisances complained of are:
1. Poluting the air with dust,
2. Disturbing the peace with sounds and lights, and
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3. Obstructing the means of ingress and egress
or right of way.
This brief will be devoted to the consideration of the
objections relating to the last of these three, the nuisance
arising from obstructing the right of way.
OBSTRUCTION OF A WAY IS A NUISANCE
In Salter v. Taylor, 55 Ga. 310 a private way was
blocked by the erection of a fence across it. This action
was brought to abate the barrier as a nuisance. The judgment abating the nuisance was affirmed. In doing so,
the court said:
"1. Was the fence a private nuisance? Blackstone says: ' A nuisance signifies anything that
worketh hurt, inconvenience or damage.' And
again he says: 'If I have a way annexed to my
estate, across another's land and he obstructs me
in the use of it, either by stopping it, or putting
logs across it, or plowing over it, it is a nuisance.'
Chitty's Blackstone, 3rd Book 215, 218. This fence
then was a nuisance."
In Frick v. Kansas City et al., 93 S.W. 351, 117 Mo.
A 488, a sewer contractor piled surplus dirt on a vacant
lot adjoining that owned by the Plaintiff and did not remove it promptly, thus barring access to Plaintiff's property. There the court said:
"The formation and maintenance of these
embankments, as detailed, constituted a private
nuisance . . . a n d the defendants are liable to the
plaintiff for her damages, that directly resulted
from such nuisance." (Emphasis added.)
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In Cadigan v. Brown, 120 Mass. 493, it is said :
"This is a bill in equity alleging that each of
the plaintiffs is the owner of a lot of land abutting
on a passageway five feet wide, and, as appurtenant thereto, has a right of way over said passageway in common with others; that the defendants
have commenced to build a house at one end of the
passage-way, so as to narrow the width of the
entrance to about four feet, and have raised the
grade and filled up a part of the passage-way so as
to injure the access to the lots of the plaintiffs.
The prayer is that the defendant be restrained
from building the house, that the said obstructions may be removed and for general relief. The
defendants demur, upon the grounds that the
plaintiffs are improperly joined, and that they do
not state a case which entitles them to relief in
equity . . . This is a private nuisance, which
entitles the plaintiffs to relief in equity . . . "
In Schaidt v. Blaul, 6 Atl. 669, 66 Md. 141, an alleyway afforded the only access to a creek from which plaintiff in the winter obtained ice for his butchering. This
was obstructed.
"In the language of the authorities, this obstruction 'reaches to the very substance and value
of the estate, and goes to the destruction of it in
the character in which it is enjoyed/ It has been
long settled that such a wrongful act will be enjoined in equity."
In Holmes v. Jones, 7 S.E. 168, 80 Ga. 659, where a
way of necessity was obstructed it was held that such
was a nuisance and it was abated.
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In Dries v. City of St. Jospeh, 73 S.W. 723, 98 Mo.
A. 611, the city blocked one end of a private alley. This
was held to be actionable.
Mr. Wood has this to say on the subject:
"It may be stated, generally, that any interference with a private way, by the landowner or
any other person, that materially interferes with
its convenient use, or by the owner of the right of
way is a nuisance, to recover the damages for
which an action on the case will lie." Wood on the
Law of Nuisance, section 170. (Emphasis added.)
In Donovan v. Pennsylvania, Co., 199 U.S. 279, 50
L. Ed. 192, 26 S. Ct. 91, the railroad brought the action
to enjoin the competing cab drivers from invading the
station to solicit patronage and from congregating on
the sidewalk so as to interfere with ingress and egress
to and from the station. The court held that the railroad
was entitled to the injunction sought and quoted with
approval and, through Mr. Justice Harlan, in part, said
(199 IT. S. 279, 302; 50 L. Ed. 192, 202 26 S. Ct. 91):
"The general doctrine is correctly stated in
Dillon on Municipal Coporations: 'For example,
an abutting owner's right of access to and from the
street, subject only to legitimate public regulation, is as much his property as his right to the
soil within his boundary lines , . . When he is deprived of such right of access, or of any other
easement connected with the use and enjoyment
of his property, other than by the exercise of
legitimate public regulation, he is deprived of
his property/ "
In Garitee v. Mayor et al., 53 Md. 422, where the
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plaintiff had a wharf which became useless by the defendants' acts in dredging and dumping the waste near the
wharf, it was held to be an interference with a means
of access and a nuisance.
In Strong v. Sullivan, 181 P. 59, 180 Cal. 331, where
a restaurant owner complained of the parking of a
portable lunch stand near the entrance to his restaurant
thus interferring with the right of access, it was held
to a nuisance.
In Barber v. Penley, L.K., 2 Ch. Div. 447 (1893)
where "Charley's Aunt" was attracting such crowds to
the Globe Theatre as to block ready access to plaintiff's premises it was held to be a nuisance.
A similar blocking of the access to property by
crowds waiting for service, with a like declaration of
the law is found in Shamhart v. Morrison Cafeteria,
32 S. 2d 727,159 Fla. 629.
To the same effect see:
Smith v. Mitchell, 58 P. 667, 21 Wash. 536;
Merchants Mutual Telephone Co. v. Hirschman, 87 N.E. 238, 43 Ind. A. 283;
Harman v. Louisville, U. 0. & T. R. Co., 11
S.W. 703, 87 Term. 614;
Fritz v. Hobson, L.R., 14 Ch. Div. 542;
Fitzgerald v. Smith, 271 P. 507, 94 Cal. A.
480;
Lane v. San Diego Electric Ey., 280 P. 109,
208 Cal. 29;
Cassel v. City of New York, 153 NYS 410;
George Washington Inn v. Consolidated Machinery, 75 F 2d 657;
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Lowell v. Pendleton Auto Co., 261 P. 415?
123 Ore. 383;
Wissler v. Hershey, 23 Pa. St. 333;
66CJS780;
46 CJ 689.
THE COMPLAINT STATES A CAUSE OF ACTION
FOR NUISANCE
It is there alleged (R. 1) that the defendant is operating a sand and gravel processing plant near the homes
of the plaintiffs; that in the course of the operation heavy
machinery is operated; that in the operation of such
machinery and the maintenance of huge stock piles of
sand and dirt that great quantities of dust arise in the
air and are carried to and deposited on the plaintiffs'
property and food; that in the operation and repair of
the equipment loud noises and flashing lights are emitted so as to interfere with normal conversation and
sleep of plaintiffs; that the defendant has dug away the
roads and placed huge stockpiles of sand and gravel so
as to obstruct and block the roads, rights of way and
means of ingress and egress; that these matters constitute a nuisance and ruin the value and enjoyment of
plaintiffs' adjacent property. In the prayer it is sought
to enjoin continuance of the nuisance and for damages.
It is not, and can not be, contended that the complaint
does not state a cause of action.
Inasmuch as the complaint does state a cause of
action resulting from the creation and operation of a
nuisance, that would dispose of all of the matters raised
by appellant under Point I.
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Without waiving this disposition of appellant's first
point, for the sake of discussion, let us see if appellant
did not waive all rights to now object.
IN THE COMPLAINT THE PLAINTIFFS CLAIM
AN OBSTRUCTION OF A RIGHT-OF-WAY
In the complaint it is alleged in part:
"6. That in the operation of said gravel
plant aforesaid, defendant . . . moves great great
quantities of dirt . . . and by . . . the stockpiling
of the resulting sand and gravel, the roads, lanes,
and creek located on the lands of the plaintiffs and
in the vicinity thereof, have become obstructed."
(K. 2)
"7. That in the operation of the said gravel
plant aforesaid defendant has . . . changed the
terrain from its original state, has dug away the
roads and placed huge stock piles of sand and
gravel, so that defendant has blocked and made
parts of plaintiffs' property inaccessible by obstructing rights of way, paths and other means of
ingress and egress to the property of the plaintiffs .. ."
Again in the last sentence of Paragraph 8 of the
complaint it is alleged, in part:
"8 . . . That the operation of said gravel pit
and processing plant, as aforesaid,... i s . . . an obstruction to the free use and access to their property . . . "
The prayer also relates to the matter as follows:
"Wherefore, plaintiffs pray . . . that the defendant be required and ordered by the court to
restore all rights of way, paths and other means
of ingress and egress to their premises. . . ."
(Emphasis added.)
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In the foregoing, complaint is made of the blocking
and destruction of roads, lanes, rights of way, paths,
access and other means of ingress and egress to and from
the property of the plaintiffs. Nothing could be broader
than these allegations. There is no restriction of the
complaint to public roads, or to private roads, lanes or
rights of way granted by deed or otherwise. It includes
public roads, private roads, lanes, rights of way of all
types, and all "other means of access," "ingress and
egress."
As pointed out above, this action was for the remedy
afforded for a nuisance. The nuisance consisted of position of the air w^ith dust, disturbing the peace with irritating sounds and lights and the interference with the
right of access, all caused by the way the defendant operated its gravel and crushing plant. The rights infringed
were several but they all resulted from the operation of
the plant. The flashes of light made in welding were
caused by a different operation than the sounds caused
by hammering off the "beads" following the welding.
These sounds were caused by a different operation than
those which resulted from the giant crushers breaking
large boulders. And while some dust came from that
same crushing, much of it came from the dropping of the
earth before and after the crushing and from the building and maintaining of the huge stock piles. These stock
piles were also the obstructions across the means of
access. The whole thing was one integrated operation
of which the obstruction was a part and the pollution of
the air and the disturbance of the peace were also a
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part. It wTas so alleged and the issue tendered to the
defendant.
Whether defendant could have required a separate
and previous trial of the issue of the ownership of a right
of way is not an issue here because,
NO STEPS WERE TAKEN TO REQUIRE A MORE
DETAILED STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE OF A
RIGHT OF WAY
The defendant filed (E. 9) a general and a special
demurrer based on misjoinder of parties and of causes
and the failure to separately state and on the uncertainty
as to the amount of damages suffered by each plaintiff.
But in these general statements no objection was made
as to the sufficiency of the allegations concerning the
nuisance arising from interference with our right of way.
Nor was it urged in the demurrer nor in the argument
thereon that the cause of action on the nuisance arising
from obstructing the ways and means of access should
be separately stated nor applified by stating the kind of
a right of way claimed nor the source of the same.
A motion to make more definite and certain was also
filed (E. 11) but in its two pages and six paragraphs
the only enlightenment desired on rights of way is found
in paragraph 4 where defendant seeks to require plaintiffs to set forth "the exact location of the rights of way,
paths and other means of ingress and egress . . ." Nowhere is there a suggestion that defendant needed more
information as to what rights of way plaintiffs claimed
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nor as to what rights might be referred to as "other
means of ingress and egress" nor as to the source of the
same.
This was a proceeding for an injunction to abate a
nuisance and to recover damages suffered. The demurrer was properly overruled because a nuisance, involving
the blocking of means of access and other invasions of
rights, was sufficiently alleged.
The appellant seeks comfort from the answers to
the interrogatories. They are as barren of help for the
appellant as the complaint is. The interrogatory in question (K. 23) was this:
"4. Will the plaintiffs set forth the exact location of the rights of way, paths and other means
of ingress and egress to the property of plaintiffs
which they allege in Paragraph 7 of their said
complaint to have been obstructed and blocked by
defendant's action V
To this the plaintiffs Budd answered (and their answer was adopted by plaintiffs Pedler (E. 28) as follows:
"4. Answering the fourth interrogatory, the
plaintiff states that the exact location of the said
right of way cannot be accurately stated because
the ground over which it passed has been excavated but that the said right of way passed from
the southerly end of the old mill property in a
southeasterly direction until it joined with the
part of the road which still remains and such right
of way was northwesterly from this plaintiff's
property, and that said right of way at all times
was easterly and northerly from the Big Cottonwood Creek and ran somewhat parallel to the
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same although at varying distances to the eastward and northward from the said Creek."
The question is directed, not to whether the way
claimed is public or private, an easement granted by
deed, one obtained by prescription or by necessity, but
merely to where it was located. The answer therefore
covers that point only, setting forth its location. There
is no help here for the claim of the appellant that the
litigation related to public roads only.
Furthermore the interrogatories themselves reveal
the broad issue of "ways' claimed by the plaintiffs. Notice the breadth of defendant's (appellant's) inquiry:
"4. Will the plaintiffs set forth the exact
location of the right-of-way, paths and other
means of ingress and egress to the property of
plaintiffs..."
The inquiry is not of roads or highways but of
"rights-of-way, paths and other means of ingress and
egress." Certainly these included rights of way by necessity.
"A right of way can be created by grant,
either express or implied. . . There are two kinds
of implied grants of rights of way: (1) Ways
by necessity, and (2) Ways by prescription." 17
Am. Jur. p. 936.
"This incorporeal heriditament is a right of
private passage over another's land. It may arise
either by grant of the owner of the soil, or by
prescription which supposes a grant, or from
necessity." 3 Kent Commentaries (13 Ed.) 581
(star page 419).

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

13
Not only was the appellant's inquiry of rights-ofway but also of "other means of ingress and egress" in
accordance with the allegations Paragraph 7 of the complaint. Clearly the easement by necessity was one of
the matters alleged in the complaint and observed by the
respondent.
To say that the only way referred to in the complaint
or interrogatories was a public one is to ignore the obvious. No broader allegations, as to the rights which were
invaded, could be made in the complaint than:
"7. . . . that defendant has blocked and made
parts of plaintiffs' property inaccessible by obstructing rights-of-way, paths and other means of
ingress and egress to plaintiffs' property." (E. 3)
The "roads, lanes, rights-of-way, paths and other
means of ingress and egress" are as broad as it is possible
to make them.
The issue of the obstruction of these roads, rightsof-way and other means of access were clearly and unmistakably raised by the complaint.
Now what does the answer do on this subject? It
merely denies the obstruction of the rights of way, roads,
and other means of access in a general denial of all the
acts of trespass alleged. See paragraphs 6, 7, & 8. (R. 21)
Clearly the issue made by the pleadings, or the pleadings and the interrogatories, is whether defendant did
deny access to plaintiffs' property and not whether
plaintiffs had a right of access. If the issue of right of
access was as important to defendant then as it became
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on the sixth day of trial and as is now urged, the defendant had ample opportunity to raise that issue. However
in the demurrer, motion to make more certain, interrogatories and answer the defendant failed to question wherein the right of access arose but contented itself with denying that its acts in preventing access constituted a nuisance.
AT PRE-TRIAL NO ISSUE OF THE RIGHT OF
ACCESS WAS RAISED
The issue which the court found from the pleadings
was (R. 30):
". . . whether the operations of the defendant
constitute or result in a nuisance . . . "
This was stipulated by the parties as the issue to
be tried. (R. 31)
Again the defendant waived any issue as to plaintiffs'
authority to use the right-of-way and contented itself
with taking the negative of the issue, that its operations
in blocking and interferring with the "rights-of-way"
and "other means of ingress and egress" constituted a
nuisance. That was the dispute between the parties and
so it remained up until the sixth day of trial. There was
no dispute as to whether plaintiffs had a right-of-way,
by necessity or grant, in company with all the public
or otherwise, but only as to whether defendant interfere d with the passage and whether that constituted a nuisance.
It is submitted that the time to frame the issues so as
to require Plaintiffs to specify whether the right they
claimed was a private right and whether it has held by
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prescription or necessity, had passed without defendant
raising the question. This would also seem to dispose
of appellant's Point I, but there is still a further w^aiver
by defendant.
ALL OBJECTION TO THE TRIAL OF THE ISSUE
OF A RIGHT-OF-WAY WAS WAIVED

This was done by permitting the introduction of
evidence on the matter without objection.
This is governed by Eule 15 (b) of the Utah Eules of
Civil Procedure which reads as follows:
"(b) AMENDMENTS TO CONFOEM TO
THE EVIDENCE. When issues not raised by
the pleadings are tried by express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings.
Such amendment of the pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to conform to the evidence and
to raise these issues may be made upon motion of
any party at any time, even after judgment; but
failure so to amend does not affect the result of
the trial of these issues. If evidence is objected to
at the trial on the ground that it is not within the
issues made by the pleadings, the court may allow
the pleadings to be amended when the presentation of the merits of the action will be subserved
thereby and the objecting party fails to satisfy the
court that the admission of such evidence would
prejudice him in maintaining his action or defense
upon the merits. The court shall grant a continuance, if necessary, to enable the objecting party
to meet such evidence." (Emphasis added.)
Concerning similar rule in the Federal practice it
is said in Moore Federal Practice:
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"At the trial, Eule 15 enables the case to be
litigated on the merits. It does this in two ways:
(a) in effect pleadings are automatically amended
to conform to proof on issues tried by express
or implied consent.9 . . . The sporting element in
litigation is eliminated."
And in note 9, referred to in the text, we read:
"9. This is true because Kule 15 (b) provides : 'Such amendment of the pleadings as may
be necessary to cause them to conform to the evidence and to raise these issues may be made upon
motion of any party at any time, even after judgment; but failure so to amend does not affect the
result of the trial of these issues.' " (3 Moore Federal Practice (Kev. Ed.) p. 805, sec. 15.02) '
Now did defendant impliedly consent to the trial
of the issue of a road, right-of-way or other means of
ingress and egress? Defendant maintains in his brief
that it did not impliedly consent but objected throughout
the trial. The transcript does not bear out this assertion.
The following evidence on the subject of roads, rights-ofway and other means of access was introduced without
objection:
(E. 209, line 10)

(By Mr. J. Eichard Mulliner.)

"Q. Now Mr. Draper, you have lived around this
place since—been acquainted with it since
about 1929. Is that your testimony here?
A. Yes, that is right.
Q. Now are you acquainted — I will ask you if
in 1929 you know by what means of access,
what the means of access was to — egress
to and access from the home, to and from the
home, which is now the Pedler home?
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A. The only way they could get into their home
wras entering in from the highway at the Old
Mill Club property and then traveling to the
south and east along toward the Old Mill
Club Eeservoir and entering through a gate
there into the Pedler home.
Q. Would you describe this roadway if you will?
A. This roadway was a well defined roadway
properly kept up because it wras the only
means of getting into the Pedler property.
Q. Do you have any present recollection of this
roadway in 1929 ?
A. Yes.
Q. What is that, what facts bring that to your
mind at the present time?
A. I worked for the Old Mill Club at that time,
and one of our duties was to keep the leaves
and shrubs out of the springs that furnish
the water to the Old Mill Club, and I would
go up there at least two or three times a week
in the performance of that duty.
Q. In 1929 wras this roadway kept up?
A. Yes.
Q. And for how long was this road open if you
recall?
A. Well, I remember this road there in 1926. My
wife and I used to drive up to that spring on
our week-end days and get water cress out
of that spring.
Q. And in 1926 was there a well defined roadway?
A. Yes, the only difference was then there was a
bridge across the Old Mill Club race and that
was in rather bad shape, but I think that was
fixed up in the spring of 1929.
GENERAL RITER: Mr. Mulliner, will you
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invite my attention to the allegations concerning
this roadway in your complaint?
ME. J. EICHAED MULLINEE: Yes, sir.
Your interrogatories direct—
THE COURT: I didn't get that last date.
(The last answer was read by the Eeporter.)
ME. J. EICHAED MULLINEE: With reference to the rights of ingress and egress.
THE COUET: You are reading from the
interrogatories.
GENEEAL E I T E E : I don't believe those
interrogatories raise the issues.
ME. J. EICHAED MULLINEE: I just
want to show it is in the complaint some place.
GENEEAL E I T E E : I want you to point out
to me where that allegation is that you are directing your interrogation.
ME. J. EICHAED MULLINEE: Paragraph
seven about changing the terrain from its original
state.
(Mr. Mulliner read Paragraph seven in the
complaint.)
GENEEAL E I T E E : Thank you very much.
Q. (By Mr. J. Eichard Mulliner) Is that road
way in existence at the present time, Mr.
Draper?
A. Well, the gravel fill is used there up as far as
the stock piles.
Q. By gravel fill do you mean J. B. and E. E.
Walker, Incorporated?
A. Yes, but from there on it is obstructed.
Q. And how is it obstructed?
A. Well, these stock piles obstruct it in the beginning.
GENEEAL E I T E E : Now if the Court please,
I wanted this interrogation to get along that far
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to give me a chance to make my record and object.
There is no evidence to show that Pedler or any
of the plaintiffs had any right to use that roadway.
THE COURT: There is no evidence showing that there is a right-of-way.
GENERAL RITER: No evidence showing
there is a right-of-way.
THE COURT: The Court will grant that.
GENERAL RITER: I move to strike this
entire evidence at this time because there must be
evidence to show their right to use it, and the
records, as they now stand, show there has been
no right, no title.
MR, J. RICHARD MULLINER: I expect to
tie that up, your Honor.
THE COURT: The motion will be taken under advisement. The Court will determine whether
or not there is any evidence on the subject before
ruling on it.
Q. (By J. Richard Mulliner) I show you the
third picture in Plaintiffs' Exhibit RR and
will ask you if any part of that right-of-way
is visible on that photograph?
A. Yes.
Q. Would you indicate where with relation to objects on that photograph the right-of-way of
this roadway was ?
A. That entered just to the right of the stop sign
and went up through where you see the dust.
Q. That was the original roadway proceeding
there in 1926, was it?
A. Yes.
Q. And has it existed to your own knowledge
ever since 1926?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, if you will state, Mr. Draper,—
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

20
GENEEAL E I T E E : Can I look at that a
minute, please?
THE COUET: You didn't show the nature
of these obstacles.
ME. J. EICHAED MULLINEE: I was just
getting to that.
Q. (By Mr. J. Eichard Mulliner) Now would
you state again what are the nature of the
obstacles to this roadway there at the present
time?
A. Well, the stock piles obstruct the road where
it existed, and then just as you get to the
northwest corner of the Pedler property there
has been a ditch dug through there and large
boulders at that point making it inaccessible
to the Eudd's property.
Q. Is it possible now to drive on this real old
road, from the Old Mill, where this old road
used to take off the Cottonwood Highway to
the Pedler property or to properties east of
there?
A. No.
Q. The sand piles that you spoke of are the sand
piles at the end of the conveyor belt that appear on Exhibit I?
A. Yes.
Q. And they are built over this roadway?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you know when it was first obstructed?
A. As near as I can remember it was the summer
of '46.
GENEEAL E I T E E : If the Court please, so
that I won't keep irritating everybody my objection, of course, runs to this entire line of testimony
and may the record so show.
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THE COURT: As to the obstacle of this
roadway to the Pedler property?
GENERAL RITER: As to the testimony
pertaining to this road.
THE COURT: It may show that. The objection is overruled.
Q. (By Mr. J. Richard Mnlliner) Is it possible
at the present time for a vehicle to proceed
from the turn off point down by the Old Mill
on the Cottonwood Highway up through the
Walker Plant to the Pedler and Dunn homes,
Rudd homes I should say?
A. It would depend on how far they went. It
might be possible to get a car in there, but the
road as it existed is plugged up.
THE COURT: By that you mean they may
drive in there but not on the old road. By that you
mean they might, they could get a car into the
Pedler property of the Old Mill, but not on the
old road!
THE WITNESS: No, it would be possible to
get a car in, but they wouldn't get a car in like
they did.
Q. (By Mr. J. Richard Mnlliner) Is there any
defined road at all there you could see?
A. After you leave the corner of the Pedler property where it is plugged off, you can see the
road from there, leading on from there, to the
Rudd property, and also you can see it from
the Old Mill entrance up to the stock piles.
Q. By that you mean you can see road from
Pedler's property east to the Old—
A. Yes.
Q. And from the Old Mill up to the stock pile.
A. Yes.
Q. Is there any right-of-way or anything discernDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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able over the Walker property, the lower
plant property itself to the stock pile ?
A. No, they might swerve around there in some
manner, but as far as the road is concerned
it is blocked off."
It is to be noted that the testimony that this road
was the only way they could get into their property (K.
209, line 18) was introduced without objection. It was
further testified that the road was well defined and had
in existence in 1926. It was at this point that the appellant inquired as to where the allegations in the complaint
as to the roadway were to be found and that when paragraph 7 was pointed out, counsel for Appellant still made
no objection (E. 211, line 4) and it was not until further
evidence was introduced as to the obstruction of the right
of way that an objection was made. Certainly it can't
be claimed that this evidence concerning the road, its
antiquity, location, appearance and obstruction which
was testified to, was introduced over the objection of the
appellant. There was no objection at all until appellant
protested as follows:
"GENERAL RITEE: Now if the Court
please, I wanted this interrogation to get along
that far to give me a chance to make my record
and object. There is no evidence here to show
that Pedler or any of the plaintiffs had any right
to use that roadway.
THE COURT: There is no evidence showing
there is a right-of-way.
GENEEAL E I T E E : No evidence showing
there is a right-of-way." (E. 211, line 13).
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And even when an objection was raised as to the
testimony, it was not that the evidence was outside of
the issues but rather that there was at that time no evidence that the plaintiffs had a right to use that roadway
or that a right-of-way existed. But there was no objection
to the litigation of that issue.
Later (R. 213, line 9) appellant stated that the "objection, of course, runs to this entire line of testimony"
and again (R. 213, line 14) "As to the testimony pertaining to this road." But the objection which it is sought
to have run to all subsequent questions is not as to
whether the pleadings were broad enough to support the
issue of a right-of-way or road or access over this property used by the appellant. The objection adopted was
merely that (R. 211, line 15) "There is no evidence here
to show that . . . the plaintiffs had a right to use that
roadway . . . (R. 211, line 19) no evidence showing there
is a right of way." (It is to be noted that in appellant's
brief no effort is made to rest on this premature objection, that there was no evidence of a right-of-way nor that
plaintiffs had a right to use it.)
Later further evidence of the road, right-of-way, or
means of access was introduced without objection. On the
third day of trial Mr. Reinsimar testified that he remembered the road in 1912 (R. 342, line 16); and that
it ran up to Rudds (R. 342, line 20); that it was an old
road then (R. 342, line 27) and he further described it (R.
343). Still there was no objection that the nuisance result-
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ing from obstruction of the right of way, was not within
the issues.
Mr. J. B. Dunn testified he remembered the road between the Old Mill and Rudds as far back as 1929 (R.
372). He was cross examined concering its location (R.
375).
Mr. Henry Butler testified on the fourth day of the
trial, without objection, that he remembered the road
as far back as 1918 (R. 520 and 521) and that it went up
to the Rudd cabin from the parking lot at the Old Mill.
On the same day the following remarks were made
(R.572,line23):
"GENERAL RITER: What are your contentions?
MR CLAWSON: That we have a way of necessity; we have a way on prescriptive right, and
possibly it is a public road under County ordinances.
GENERAL RITER: You haven't plead the
County ordinances.
MR. CLAWSON: We may have to." (Emphasis added.)
Here, clearly, was the contention made that the way
might be claimed as one of necessity. Yet there was no
objection that such a way was not within the issues.
Charles Rudd testified one couldn't get into his
cabin, except over this road (R. 580, line 24) but there
was still no objection.
Glen Rudd testified that the road ran from the Old
Mill to the Rudd property and that there was no other
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way of getting in (R. 584) and that it was an old road
when he remembered it first (R. 585).
It was not until after all of this testimony was received, and on the sixth day of trial, November 1, 1950,
that the first objection was made wherein it was claimed
that the right-of-way was not within the issues (R. 651,
line 14).
So we submit that appellant did not object to the trial
of the issue of roads, rights-of-way and means of access
but contented itself by merely objecting (R. 209, line 10
et seq.), after the ground had been substantially covered
without objecting; that respondent had not, up to that
time, shown a right to use this road or that there was a
right-of-way (R. 211).
Under Rule 15b of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
the enlarging of the issues is permitted. If such action
prejudiced the appellant, a continuance would have been
granted. No continuance was sought. And the trial lasted
from October 23rd to November 29th with numerous
interruptions in the five week interval. Appellants can't
say they have been prejudiced. This is merely a point
made on appeal, one which was not of sufficient importance to raise before or during the trial of this case.
Point No. 2 (found on page 54 of Appellant's brief,
raises the question of the adjudication of the question
of a right of way without the presence of one of the principal stockholders of appellant (paragraph 3 of Ex.
UUU) and the wife of the president of the appellant. This
is merely another way of saying that a non joinder is
claimed.
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NON JOINDER IS WAIVED BY FAILING TO RAISE
THE POINT UNLESS THE PARTY IS INDISPENSABLE
THE OWNER WAS NOT INDISPENSABLE.
In the case of In Be Thompson's Estate, 269 P. 103,.
108; 72 Utah 17, this court (Justice Straup speaking)
said:
"The assignment that the widow ought to
have been made a party is overruled. Under our
Code, defect of parties is something to be taken
advantage of by special demurrer or by answer.
The special demurrers were on grounds of ambiguity and uncertainty, and not on grounds of defect or want of parties. Nor was the matter raised
by answer. Unless raised by demurrer or by
answer, the defect was waived. Nor do we see
wherein the widowT was a proper, much less a necessary or indispensable party."
And in Buliler v. Maddison, 166 P. 2d 205, 212; 109 Utah
245, this court said:
"Lastly, we consider appellant's special demurrer for defect of parties defendant. This objection must fall on two grounds, firstly as not
being properly raised, and secondly as not being
timely presented to the court. It is said in 39 A.
Jr. 110:
" 'Under the common-law practice, and in jurisdictions in which the practice is still fundamentally according to the common law, an objection to the non-joinder of parties can, as a general
rule, be taken advantage of only by a plea in abatement, or by a plea or answer in the nature thereof,
although there is authority to the effect that at
common law if the defect appears on the face of
the pleading objection may be taken advantage
of by demurrer or in arrest of judgment.' "
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Again this respondent refers the Court to the Utah Kules
of Civil Procedure (19b) which provide:
"(b)

EFFECT OF FAILUEE TO JOIN.

When parties who are not indispensable, but who
ought to be parties if complete relief is to be accorded between those already parties, have not
been made parties and are subject to the jurisdiction of the court as to service of process, the court
shall order them summoned to appear in the action. The court in its discretion may proceed in
the action without making such persons parties,
if its jurisdiction over them can be acquired only
by their consent or voluntary appearance; but the
judgment rendered therein does not effect the
rights or liabilities of absent persons."
It will be noted that there is no evidence that Mary
Golf Walker is a resident of Utah or that she was, between the time of the commencement of this suit and the
judgment, in the State of Utah and hence that she was
subject to the jurisdiction of this court. This would seem
to dispose of the point unless she was an indispensable
party. Inasmuch as we are following Federal Kules a
case from the Supreme Court of the United States should
be helpful on this matter of who are indispensable parties. Mr. Justice Curtis spoke for that court in the case
of Shields v. Barrows (17 How. 130, 136; 15 L. Ed. 158,
160):
"The court here points out three classes of
parties to a bill in equity. They are: 1. Formal
parties. 2. Persons having an interest in the controversy, and who ought to be made parties, in
order that the court may act on that rule which reDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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quires it to decide on, and finally determine the
entire controversy, and do complete justice, by
adjusting all the rights involved in it. These persons are commonly termed necessary parties; but
if their interests are separable from those of the
parties before the court so that the court can proceed to a decree, and do complete and final justice,
without affecting other persons, not before the
court, the latter are not indispensable parties.
3. Persons who not only have an interest in the
controversy, but an interest of such a nature that
a final decree cannot be made without either affecting that interest, or leaving the controversy
in such a condition that its final termination may
be wholly inconsistent with equity and good conscience."
The California case of McKelvey v. Eodriguez, 134
P. 2d 870, 874; 57 Cal. A. 2d 214, is in point. There an
action in ejectment or payment of the purchase price
was begun by the executor of the deceased seller of real
estate against the heir, in possession, of the deceased
buyer. No attempt was made to bring in the other heirs
of the buyer and the heir sued raised a defense of non
joinder. Judgment for the Plaintiff resulted in this appeal. In affirming the decree the court discussed the
non joinder and said:
"The adjudication in the present case was not
in effect an adjudication that the contract was in
default for failure of the purchaser or her successors to perform the terms thereof, but was merely
an adjudication of appellants' default in refusing
to pay the balance claimed to be due, upon demand
therefor. The other heirs and successors are not
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precluded thereby from taking advantage of any
waiver of performance of the terms of the contract. It is thus demonstrated that the interest
of appellants is separable in this respect from that
of the other heirs. * * * The entire controversy
existing between respondents and the heirs at law
of Merced Castaneda is not settled by the suit in
ejectment against appellants. It has merely been
determined that if appellants desire to occupy
and enjoy the premises they must pay the balance
due on the purchase thereof. The status of the
contract and any waiver of strict performance of
its terms, with relation to the other heirs, remains
undetermined and unaffected by the judgment in
the present action."
In another case (Bank of California v. Superior
Court, 106 P. 2d 879, 16 Cal. 2d 516) an action was
brought upon a promise made to plaintiff by a decedent
to leave all the latter's property to the promisee. The action was brought to enforce the agreement, All of the
heirs were made parties but only part were served. A
motion was made to require the service of summons on
the other heirs and, upon an adverse ruling this action
for a writ of prohibition was sought. In denying the
writ of the court (106 P. 2d at 883) discussed "necessary"
and "indispensable" parties and said:
"These two terms have frequently been
coupled together as if they have the same meaning; but there appears to be a sound distinction,
both in theory and practice, between parties
deemed 'indispensable' and those considered merely 'necessary.' As Professor Clark has remarked:
'It has been objected that the terms 'necessary'
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and 'indispensable' convey the same idea * * *
But a distinction has been drawn. While necessary
parties are so interested in the controversy that
they should normally be made parties in order to
enable the court to do complete justice, yet if their
interests are separable from the rest and particularly wiiere their presence in the suit cannot be
obtained, they are not indispensable parties. The
latter are those without whom the court cannot
proceed.' Clark Code Pleading, p. 245, note 21.
See, also, as to the distinction in the federal
courts, Franz v. Buder, 8 Cir., 11 F. 2d 854, 856;
Atwood v. Rhode Island Hospital Trust Co., 1 Cir.,
275 F. 513, 24 A.L.R. 156."
In the case at bar the decree has been entered. It has
not been shown that the decree in any way affects the
rights of the principal stockliolder of appellant except
as the action affects the appellant itself. It does not
attempt to establish as against her that the plaintiffs
or some of them have an easement over her land. She is
still at liberty to raise that issue.
The appellant cites three cases to show that one
of the principal stockholders and the wife, of the president and principal witness, J. B. Walker, was an indispensable party. The first case cited is a Montana one
entitled Campbell v. Flaunery et al., 79 Pae. 702, 32 Mont.
119. Here the plaintiffs bought a farm which included a
reclaimed creek bottom. The waters which formerly
flowed in the creek were diverted across the land occupied but not owned by defendants, over which the plaintiff claimed an easement for this purpose. It doesn't
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appear from the court's opinion just why it considered
that the land owner was an indispensable party. There
is the mere bald statement to that effect. But in analyzing
the case this fact becomes evident. We are dealing with
the flow of water. Unless the water has a proper outlet
it could do great damage by erosion or by being darned
up until it broke its confines. Unless there was a right
to have the flood waters continue down the diversion
ditch great damage could result. Under these circumstances it is conceivable that the court might require the
land owner as an indispensable party. But there are no
such facts here. We are not dealing with water. There
is no damming up of an element until great danger to the
land owner is involved. No great damage to the land
already being used for the storage of huge stock piles of
sand and the pounding of mammoth trucks filled with
great loads of sand, could result from permitting the
passage of persons and vehicles to the Eudd house. In our
case, there is no great danger of a sudden freshet throwing a destructive force against the land. In fact there is
no danger of any damage being done to the land over
which passage has been had from 1910 on, and apparently
from time immemorial. If the interests of the wife of the
president of defendant and one of the principal stockholders of the defendant was not sufficiently represented
in the case at bar, she can bring a separate action to
deny to plaintiffs the right of way which has existed so
long and which the lower court found to be one of necessity.
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But the portion of the Campbell decision quoted by
appellant was mere dicta, as the court points out (in the
next sentence to the one quoted by appellant) where it
says: "The main 'point in this case . . . is the question
whether or not the defendants are estopped by the conduct of defendant William Flaunery..."
That this statement is mere dicta is also shown by
the fact that the court had already disposed of the question of an easement over the servient estate by pointing
out that the defendant had disclaimed to hold by prescription and that the grant claimed was under a statute
which did not give an easement. So the statement quoted
by appellant is just dicta and as such, is of doubtful authority.
The second case cited is no more assistance to the
respondent. In Peryer v. Pennock, 115 Atl. 105, 95 Vt.
313, 17 ALE 863 the action was for specific performance
of an installment contract for the purchase of land and
(see 95 Vt. 314) for damage for inability to convey a good
right of way. Plaintiff sought to compel defendant to accept partial payments before the same were due and to
execute a deed and accept a mortgage. The court held
this could not be done and reversed the judgment for
the plaintiff. However, since defendant was willing to
convey upon such payments, etc., if other demands of
plaintiff, outside of the contract, were ignored, there remained the matter of plaintiff's claim for damages for
inability of defendant to convey the contracted right-of-

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

33
way. Defendant claimed the owner of the servient estate
recognized the right-of-way. The court, in remanding the
case, said the owner of the servient estate should be made
a party "if the decree is to have effective force on all
concerned. On a remand of this case, the court of chancery should refuse to proceed to make a decree until
Goodrich is made a party . . ." But the court does not
discuss indispensable parties nor say that the owner of
the servient estate was an indispensable party. In fact
the court expressly hedges the statement that Goodrich
should be made a party by adding, "if the decree is to
have effective force on all concerned." The court obviously recognizes that he is not an indispensable party but
merely a necessary party if he is to be bound by the decree. But there is no requirement that he be bound if
the parties to the litigation do not seek such action.
Furthermore it could well be that the owner of the servient estate is an indispensable party. The plaintiff
claimed that the owner of the servient estate denied the
existence of a right-of-way while the defendant claimed
the servient owner recognized the obligation. To really
do justice to the parties, the owner of the servient estate
was an essential and probably an indispensable party.
The last case cited by appellant (Fox v. Paul, 148
Atl. 809, 158 Md. 379, 68 ALE 520) adds nothing. As
it says there, where it is sought to locate a way of necessity the party over whose land such way is to be located
must be a party. But in the case at bar it is not sought
to bind the principal stockholder of appellant and wife of
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of the president of appellant as to the right of way. We
merely seek to have a roadway (called variously a road,
a right-of-way, a means of access, and a means of ingress and egress) restored. No adjudication of the right
of way between these plaintiffs and this stockholder, is
sought. The evidence show^s that this defendant corporation in utter disregard of the rights of the property
owners, scouped out the road, cut the level of the plant
pit floor beneath the level of the remaining road and
by this means and by piling great quantities of sand and
gravel and road aggragate across the pit floor, cut off
the access to the property above. It is sought to have
this interruption of access terminated and permit passage
across the area over which the destroyed road ran.
If we were seeking by this action to obtain a legal
adjudication for all time that the plaintiffs or some of
them had a right of way across these lands, obviously
the owner of the land would be an indispensable party.
But that is not this action. Here the plaintiffs seek to enjoin a nuisance which consists in poluting the air, emitting irritating noises and lights and blocking a roadway
and compensation for damage done thereby. There is no
more reason for holding that the defendants' landlord
is an indispensable party in the nuisance suit for obstructing the roadway than for poluting the air.
Furthermore, in answer to the objection that the wife
of the president of the defendant and one of the principal
stockholders of the defendant, should have made a party
and was indispensable in this cause, it is to be observed
that the owner did not obstruct the right-of-way. There
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is no complaint against her as there is against the defendant.
It is also evident that the fact that defendant is a
lessee in possession of the property has nothing to do
with the case. Defendant is not being sued as lessee.
It could be in there as a rank trespasser and still be liable
for any interference with our passage.
Obviously the wife of the president of defendant
and one of its principal stockholders, is not an indispensable party and hence the appeal cannot be sustained
on the ground of non joinder.
The third point made by appellant is found on page
58 of the brief. Extensive quotations are made from
cases as to the trial of law questions in equitable actions
and finally two Utah cases are referred to. In both of the
latter, a trial by jury was sought before the submission
of the cases (Valley Mortuary v. Fairbanks,
Utah
.._.._, 225 P. 2d 739, 743, referred to at the bottom of page
66 of appellant's brief, and Norbeck v. Board of Directors
etc., 37 P. 2d 339, 84 Utah 506. We have no quarrel with
the law there set forth. It just has no application to the
facts in this case. In the case at bar no demand for a
jury was made before the trial, as required Eule 38 of the
Utah Kules of Civil Procedure. Appellant admits that
no demand was made (page 66 of brief) but says that
it was excused because it would have been compelled to
elect between its position that a way of necessity was not
within the issues and consenting to the trial of that issue.
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Disregarding, for the sake of the argument, all other
answers, it is sufficient to say that when appellant objected to the trial of that issue and lost, then was the
time that a demand for a jury should have been made.
Rule 39 (b) provides in part :
". . . but, notwithstanding the failure of a
party to demand a jury in an action in w^hich such
a demand might have been made of right, the court
in its discretion upon motion may order a trial by
jury on any or all issues/'
If the trial by jury of this issue wTas as important before
the appellant lost the case as it now seeks to make out,
why didn't the appellant request a jury when its objection was overruled? The trial by jury was waived first
in not demanding it before trial (Rule 38) and second
in failing at any time throughout the five weeks of trial
to move the court to submit that issue to a jury. Appellant does not show the diligence required to obtain a jury
by delaying until after an adverse decision to first talk
of one.
Nor is an excuse for the failure to demand a jury
aided by the plea that appellant did not know that there
was an issue concerning right of way. As pointed out
above (see page 8 of this brief) in paragraph 6
of the complaint (R. 2) it was alleged that the stock
piling of the sand obstructed the roads and lanes and in
paragraph 7 it was alleged that appellant "dug away the
roads" and "blocked and made parts of plaintiffs' property inaccessable by obstructing rights of way, paths, and
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other means of ingress and egress . . ." and, in paragraph 8, obstructed "free use and access" and the prayer
was "that defendant be required and ordered by the court
to restore all rights of way, paths and other means of
ingress and egress" All of the allegations were denied.
Eight of passage by road or lane, public or private and
by easement, through grant, prescription or necessity
was clearly an issue. If appellant had then been as
anxious then for a trial by jury as it is now, a demand
could have been made. It did not choose to seek such
a trial then as required by Rule 38b even though the issue
so submitted to the jury could be limited as permitted
by Rule 38c. Nor did appellant at any time during the
trial request a jury. It raises this issue for the first time
after an adverse decision and, we suspect, merely because of it.
The fourth point (page 67 of appellant's brief) is
that a proceeding for an injunction is not the proper
means of trying title to real estate. To substantiate this
point appellant quotes from several authorities to the
effect where "the primary purpose of the suit was to
establish an easement" "the right to injunctive relief
could not come into existence until the easement had
been established . . ." to requote a part of excerpt taken
from the Valley Mortuary case (225 P 2d 750) found on
pages 69 and 70 of appellant's brief.
Again we have no quarrel with the law cited. It just
has no application. The quotation is based upon the
premise stated: ". . . that the primary purpose of the
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suit was to establish an easement..." The primary purpose of our action is not to establish an easement but to
curb a nuisance. The complaint seeks to restrain the
emitting of disturbing sounds and lights by the operation and repair of heavy equipment and the polution of
the air by the operation of such equipment and by the
building and maintaining of large stockpiles of sand?
gravel etc., and the obstructing of the means of access
to plaintiffs' property by the maintenance of the same
stockpiles. The obstructing of the "rights of way" and
the "means of ingress and egress" were merely incidental
to and connected with the other nuisances committed at
the same time and largely by the same means. The complaint about the obstruction of the way was not the primary purpose of the action as required under Norback
v. Board of Directors etc., 37 P. 2d 339, 84 Utah 506, it
was merely an incidental point. More than nine-tenths
of the entire testimony requiring five weeks of trial related to matters not involving the right of way.
Appellant's fifth point w^hich is argued beginning
at page 71 of its brief relates to a way of necessity and
the fact that as such it ceases when the need passes.
We have no quarrel with the law but it has no application. There was no evidence that the need for this access
road had ceased to exist. And there was positive evidence that the road was the only means of access (E.
580, line 26; E. 581, line 8; E. 584, line 29).
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It is respectfully submitted:
1. That obstructions to a right-of-way is a nuisance.
2. That the complaint states a cause of action for
nuisance.
3. That in the complaint the plaintiffs claim an obstruction of a right of way.
4. That no steps were taken by demurrer, motion,
answer or interrogatories to require a more definite
statement of the rights infringed.
5. That at Pre-trial no issue of the right of access,
was raised.
6. That all objections to the trial of the issue of
right of way was waived by the failure to object to introduction of evidence on the point.
7. That Mrs. Walker was not an indispensable
party and her non-joinder was waived.
8. That the defendant and appellant has failed to
show any grounds for reversal and the decree below
should be affirmed.
Kespectfully submitted,
IRWIN CLAWSON,
Attorney for Respondents Rudds
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